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Abstract 
This paper investigates the political conditions which have enabled the development of restorative             
justice, in England and Wales, over the last 30 years. The rise of restorative justice is considered                 
integral to the emergence of a (rather incoherent) range of political problematics, addressed by a               
panoply of governmental technologies, and informed by competing political rationalities. By applying a             
governmentality approach, the work aims to shed light on the assemblage of ambivalent principles and               
values which constitute restorative justice by linking them to context-specific political contingencies.            
This could have implications in understanding both the fragmentary growth of restorative justice in              
England and Wales, and, more generally, the political dimension of restorative practices, beyond the              
British borders.  
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Introduction 
The political context of RJ has been extensively explored by both RJ advocates (Braithwaite, 1999;               
Marshall, 1996; Wright, 1996) and scholars (Dignan, 2005; Hoyle and Cunneen, 2010; Johnstone,             
2011; Newburn and Crawford, 2003). The present work can be located within the limited province of                
the literature on the political background of RJ applying a governmentality mode of analysis (Lippens,               
2014; O’Malley, 2009; Pavlich, 2005; Richards, 2011). 
The paper revolves around the idea that the spreading of legal/policy measures, as well as practical and                 
theoretical interest around RJ, in England and Wales, over the last 30 years, has been possible due to                  
the parallel rise of a combination of political rationalities – that is, ​ethopolitics (Rose 1996b, 1999a) –                 
informing the governmental practice in the relevant geo-historical setting. To think in terms of              
‘political rationalities’ (Foucault, 1982, 1991, 2008) helps to offer an inclusive, productive and             
politically engaged approach which connects social, cultural and ethical dimensions of the practice of              
government with penal discourses, institutions and practices. The paper starts by describing the             
methodological and theoretical orientations which drive this work. After drawing a working definition             
of RJ, the research maps out a number of context-specific political problematics and technologies              
relevant to the rise of RJ. The paper finally distills the political rationalities which inform this                
landscape, and their subjectivating effects. Some final reflections are also offered. This works aims to               
be helpful to those interested in deepening their understanding of the development of RJ by linking this                 
to specific political mentalities. This could have implications both in terms of reframing the steady but                
patchy growth of RJ in England and Wales and of re-thinking the political drive and effects of                 
restorative practices, beyond the British borders.  
 
 
1. Methodological and theoretical considerations 
 
Governmentality is an analytical grid which aims to reconstruct the ‘reasoned way of governing best               
and, at the same time, [the] reflection on the best possible way of governing’ (Foucault, 2008: 2). This                  
framework is solely concerned with how the governmental practice (i.e. process of conducting others’              
1 
 
conduct (Foucault, 1982: 225)), is conceptualised and rationalised by a multiplicity of social and              
individual actors (Foucault, 1991: 84). The focus is posited on the rationales of government: how ends                
and means, moral justifications, problems and solutions of government are generated, problematised            
and conveyed. From this perspective, the primary feature of the governmental practice are ​problematics              
of government, a fluid set of predicaments and the possible responses to them, contingently ​elaborated               
by a plurality of actors (Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). The deployment of responses to political                
problems is operated by ​political ​technologies ​which ‘shape, normalize and instrumentalize the            
conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objects they consider               
desirable’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 8). From the examination of these two dimensions it is possible to                 
infer the ​political rationalities which, often through ​strategic combinations (Rose, O’Malley and            
Valverde, 2006: 88), drive the art of government (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). The main advantages of                 
this approach are its inclusivity (by subjecting to political analysis a domain much broader than state                
juridical operations), productivity (by connecting politics with epistemological, moral and ontological           
issues) and political engagement (by opening up new spaces of political contestation, beyond the              
critique of state politics).  
The paper advances the hypothesis that the development of RJ is a possible response to specific                
political problematics, enacted by certain technologies and permeated by a combination of competing             
political rationalities (that is ‘​ethopolitics​’ (Rose 1996b, 1999a)). Problematics, technologies and           
rationalities are conceived of as discourses (Miller and Rose, 1990: 4), that is, cultural formations               
produced by contextual actors in order ‘to structure the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault,                
1982: 221). These discourses are reconstructed by piecing together scientific knowledges, ethical            
doctrines and legal/policy narratives on the matters (problematics), modes (technologies) and logics            
(rationalities) of government, circulating in the relevant context and encoded in a plurality of texts. By                
intersecting, competing and conflicting, they provide scholars, practitioners and policymakers with           
particular vocabularies and ways of making sense of public and individual issues, including crime and               
crime responses, thus shaping distinctive needs, ambitions and interests. RJ emerges when marginal             
justice practices reach a certain epistemological/political threshold, that is, when their language,            
assumptions and justifications become consistent with those needs and interests, as part of a contingent               
transformation involving the art of government. Such an ‘emergence’ is not a historical end-point but               
an ongoing process concerning a plethora of actors, whereby unexpected clashes and alliances,             
drawbacks and advances seem to alternate. 
Governmentality-oriented explorations of RJ have been available since the early 2000s (Lippens, 2015;             
O’Malley, 2009; Pavlich 2005; Richards, 2011). Compared to this extant literature, this work is original               
in a number of interconnected ways. Firstly, it targets a specific geo-historical domain (England and               
Wales, 1985–2015) with a long-lasting history of reparative practices and a steady growth, over the last                
three decades, of policy/legal regulations, administrative bodies, fundings and services in the field of              
RJ. To date, governmentality-focussed investigations of RJ in this context are not available.             
Additionally, the paper uses the relatively under-exploited concept of ‘ethopolitics’ (Rose 1996b,            
1999a), purposely re-elaborated (Garland, 1997; O’Malley, 1999), as analytical scheme to understand            
RJ’s political “roots”.  
There are three main limitations to the research. Firstly, discourses are articulated in practices and               
institutions, and this likely alters their political rationales. However, the conceptualisation of the             
governmental practice is still a significant research object, since it constitutes one dimension of the               
actual government. From this perspective, the paper aims to develop historically-grounded critical            
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insights on the political background of RJ, integral to a deliberately incomplete genealogical work              
(Garland, 1997). Secondly, this study is a theoretical investigation of a long-term historical dynamic,              
and as such tends to be abstract and over-generalising. Yet, the primary goal is to map out certain kinds                   
of power/knowledge which underpin the development of RJ. From this angle, abstraction and             
generalisation are useful heuristic instruments (Garland, 2001: 21). Finally, the following analyses            
apply only to RJ in criminal justice settings, and practised by victim-offender mediation and              
conferencing.  
 
2.1 ​Restorative justice: a working meta-definition 
The paper understands RJ as a field of discourses on why and how to deal with crimes, which has                   
developed in western countries since the early 1980s. From the variety of RJ approaches it is possible                 
to elaborate three ideal-typical discourses, which cover much of that field: ‘encounter’, ‘reparative’ and              
‘transformative’ (Johnstone and Van Ness, 2007: 1). The encounter discourse highlights the active             
participation of relevant crime stakeholders (‘victim’, ‘offender’ and ‘community’) in order to manage             
the consequences of the criminal behaviour (Zehr, 1990). The restorative conference makes possible             
the expression and discussion of the emotional, social, symbolic and material issues at stake, aiming to                
restore the relationships among the relevant stakeholders. The reparative discourse refers to an             
understanding of how to deal with crimes and their consequences, based on the idea of repairing harms                 
(Wright, 1982, 1996). This view is critical to the retributive idea to coerce the offender to endure pain                  
proportionate to the gravity of the crime committed, emphasising instead community-based reparation            
of the crime’s harmful consequences. Finally, in the transformative discourse, RJ is understood as an               
overall worldview which can lead people to perceive and act upon the world and themselves in a                 
restorative way, i.e. relying on peacebuilding through dialogue and agreement (Sullivan and Tifft,             
2001). The premise of this view is a relational understanding of humans (Johnstone and Van Ness,                
2007: 17), their “natural” interconnectedness which can be hindered by destructive and antisocial             
behaviours. These three main discourses work as repertoires from which values, aims, goals,             
metaphors, storylines and stakeholders’ images can be mobilised, with intersections and tensions            
(ANONYMISED), by policy-makers, practitioners, reformers.  
 
In England and Wales, actual RJ programmes (Davis, 1992; Shapland et al., 2006), regulatory bodies’               
documents (Restorative Justice Consortium, 2004; Restorative Justice Council, 2011, 2015) and policy            
and legal texts (No More Excuses white paper 1997; Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Youth justice and                 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999; Justice for All white paper 2002; Criminal Justice Act 2003; Criminal               
Justice and Immigration Act 2008; Restorative Justice Action Plan 2013) apply and combine these              
discourses in several ways. Additionally, due the diversity of values underpinning the different             
discourses, RJ appears also as an ambivalent assemblage of aspirations, aims and goals. The reasons for                
such an entanglement are multiple. Historically, the development of local reparative programs since the              
late 1970s, variously promoted by both victim and offender’s “movements” (Davis, 1992: 31),             
combined with the influence of theoretical developments from the USA and with exchanges with              
scholars and practitioners from Australia and New Zealand (Marshall, 1999: 14), has likely contributed              
toward the complexity of RJ in England and Wales. However, being the way societies envision and                
enact responses to crimes a constitutively political matter (Foucault, 1977), it should be considered the               
political dimension of such a dynamic entanglement, in order to understand the development of the RJ                
field.  
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 3 The political dimension of restorative justice in England and Wales: a governmentality             
perspective 
From a governmentality viewpoint, RJ can be conceptualised as an effect of certain political              
technologies, i.e. a response to heterogeneous problematics of government, informed by a rather             
incoherent, contingent and strategic combination of political rationalities (i.e. ‘​ethopolitics​’ (Rose           
1996b, 1999a)). The actors of this dynamic are individuals, groups and agencies engaged in daily               
meaning-making, problem-generating and problem-solving activities which aim to make people          
amenable to direction, in order to achieve desirable objectives. However, this process is not a perfected                
and rational one. Due to the changing composition of the governmental actors and their context, it is                 
likely that unexpected convergences and conflicts will be engendered (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde,             
2006: 98). As a consequence, political technologies deploy unfinished and inconsistent responses to the              
problematics at stake (O’Malley, 1999: 182). As the paper will argue, the emergence (and inner               
structure) of RJ is an instance of these fragmentary responses.  
3.1 Political problematics 
 
Everyday youth offenders and the end of the ‘excuse culture’  
Over the last three decades, the political configuration of the youth crime “problem” has resulted in                
specific ways of thinking and doing. The ‘juvenile delinquent’, once understood as a transient condition               
addressed by needs-based tools, during the 1970s becomes a distinctively harmful criminal type (Pitts,              
2001). Juvenile delinquents are now working class muggers who do not grow out of crime, whose                
actions are often highly harmful (Pitts, 2001: 9) and require restrictive measures. As Muncie (1999:               
153) notices, as a consequence of this understanding, from the late 1970s, the welfare principle came to                 
be “counterbalanced” by an authoritarian approach, linked to conservative political preferences and            
exemplified by the Criminal Justice Act 1982 and 1991. From the second half of 1990s a further shift                  
occurs, in terms of both political rendering of the juvenile delinquent (or youth offender) and of                
responses to this problematic. The image of “welfarist” juvenile delinquents, although sedimented in             
the practice of penal institutions, such as probation services, loses grip on media and political               
discourses. Working class muggers become “alien” criminals, whilst parallelly a new representation of             
“everyday” youth offenders gradually surfaces public debates (Garland, 2001). This latter category,            
particularly relevant for the development of RJ, consists of de-responsibilised youths who breach the              
interpersonal trust which ties them and the victim together, within a shared community             
(ANONYMISED). Their actions require formal consequences which involve also parents and the            
community at large. To respond to these youth ‘ideal offenders’ a new strategy slowly emerges,               
whereby authoritarian instruments are combined with a community-based re-moralizing ethos (Muncie,           
1999; Newburn and Crawford, 2003) and informed by the ambiguous rhetoric of ending the ‘excuse               
culture’ (Home Office, 1997). Measures contained in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Youth               
justice and Criminal Evidence act 1999 such as the abolishment of the ​doli incapax and curfew                
measures (for the incorrigible youth delinquents), parenting orders, reparation orders, youth offenders            
panels (for the everyday youth offenders), represent the “solution” to the youth problem. The              
(incoherent) goals pursued are to responsibilise in the community, strengthening controls but also             
promoting alternatives to custody, as well as to diffuse a culture of early prevention and support for                 
everyday youth offenders (Home Office, 2002). The production of such an web of narratives,              
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overlapping yet opposing, is the effect of the combined activities of third sector agencies, criminal               
justice and social policy scholars, reformers and practitioners, as well as governmental bodies. These              
actors and their discourses around youth offenders, have played a critical role for the emergence of RJ.                 
For example, the ‘three Rs’ (responsibility, restoration and reintegration) policy which will inform New              
Labour plans on (everyday) youth offenders (1997, 2001b), was originally elaborated by a third sector               
agency, the National Association for the Care & Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO ) (Green, 2014).              1
This approach (echoing RJ’s basic tenets) establishes the youth’s acceptance of responsibility for the              
harm, the reparation of its consequences and then the reintegration in the community as the pillars of                 
justice interventions, at least for everyday youth offenders. In a similar vein, probation services’              
(welfarist) emphasis on diversion, mitigation and offender education, combined with the ideas of penal              
minimalism and ‘civilising’ criminal justice (Christie, 1977; Harding, 1982; Wright, 1982) are injected             
at the heart of reparative initiatives for minor youth criminals in the 1980s (Liebman, 2007: 40) and                 
will remain as a constant component of RJ as a diversionary intervention with youth offenders (Davis,                
1992). Finally, cultural exchanges with youth justice practitioners and scholars from USA, Australia             
and New Zealand, often mediated by religious groups (mainly Quaker and Mennonite), since the              
1980s, have fostered interest around reparative practices (Liebman, 2007: 41) or theories like             
‘reintegrative shaming’, which will contribute toward the development of RJ programs in the UK,              
especially for less serious crimes committed by (everyday) youth offenders.  
 
Reinventing the crime victim (again) 
A second problematic is represented by the “marginalisation” of the crime victim within the criminal               
justice system. This is a topic widely discussed within the RJ literature (Johnstone, 2011: 51; Wright,                
1996: 100) and that is analysed here from the perspective of its political construction in the relevant                 
geo-historical context. The development of this discourse is (once again) the contingent result of the               
action of several players: political parties, media, voluntary/third sector agencies, academic scholars.  
It is well known how political parties (from both conservative and labour backgrounds) initiate an               
instrumental re-definition of the crime victim in the early 1980s (Kearon and Godfrey, 2007), both in                
terms of political use of victimisation surveys (Mayhew and Hough, 1988) and of political re-coding               
the crime victims’ dissatisfaction toward the criminal justice responses. The victim re-enters the             
political agenda as a symbolic actor able to appeal to the wide public, by catalysing sympathy and                 
generating emotionally loaded responses to crime (Garland, 2001: 143), as a disempowered subject             
with idealised characteristics, “asking for” expressive punishments. The emphasis on specific crime            
victims, considered discrete entities, ontologically distinguished from the offender, increasingly          
features mass-media dramatised accounts on crime since the 1980s and reaches a critical peak in the                
1990s (Jewkes, 2004). This account is partly challenged by third-sector organisations coalescing            
around an initial British grassroot “victims’ movement” (Rock, 1990). Here the victim is characterised              
by specific socio-demographic features (women and children), personal qualities (vulnerability,          
disempowerment, marginalisation) and advances specific demands: involvement, compensation,        
restitution, punishment. Reparation, in this context, is a contentious topic due to its perceived              
ambivalent status. Although the early British victims’ movement (and namely the National Association             
of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS)) contributed to the creation of relevant services, conferences and              
other initiatives (including the launch in 1984 of the Forum for initiatives in reparation and mediation),                
the perceived tight links between reparation and offender-centered diversionary programs advanced by            
1 NACRO (1997) ​3Rs: responsibility, restoration & reintegration. A new three Rs for young offenders.​ London: NACRO. 
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probation services, was a deterrent to a complete acceptance of the reparative option (Reeves, 1989:               
44). In the 1990s, the fragmentary victims’ movement (led by NAVSS’s successor, i.e. Victim Support)               
reaches further visibility through the consolidation of practical initiatives (e.g. Victim Support            
Schemes), in a situation of increasing media attention toward crime victims (Walklate, 2007: 132), and               
so it does the relevant victim’s image. This growth intertwines with the development of a “new”                
victimology, which advocates for a shift from an “old” to a “new” way of understanding and                
supporting crime victims (focussing on their needs and not only rights) (Maguire, 1985; Mawby, 1988;               
Shapland et al., 1985), a perspective which also progressively contributes toward the Home Office way               
of thinking about victims (Home Office, 2002, 2003a). The overarching theme across these entangled              
yet conflicting representations of the victim’s problematic, is a critique of the current criminal justice,               
though without questioning its structural issues (Davis, 1992: 176), as well as the response to it: the                 
creation of a “victim-centered” criminal justice (Garland, 2001: 11). This translates into a wide range               
of policy documents (Home Office, 2001b, 2002, 2005), legal initiatives (Victim’s Charter 1990, 1996;              
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (2006); Crime and Disorder Act 1998), and actual interventions                
(e.g. Victim Support’s witness services or reparation programs (Liebman, 2007: 38)). A            
‘victim-centered criminal justice’ here does not entail investing on reparation but strengthening victim             
participation in criminal proceedings (which resonates with RJ claims of empowering victims though)             
and enhancing responsibility on local authorities to adopt a multi-agency line of action when working               
with victims of crime. 
 
Eclipsing communities and third way solutions 
The discourse on the “eclipsing” of moral communities (Etzioni, 1993; Giddens, 1998), as effect of the                
combined action of conservative individualism and post-war social democracy (Drivel and Martell,            
1997: 27), penetrates into the UK politics of law and order in the 1990s, contributing toward New                 
Labour’s communitarian social, criminal and penal policies. Community here is fundamentally a “lack”             
(of order, morality, responsibility, localism) generated by political liberalism through promotion of            
individualistic tendencies as well as by the left by depriving local communities of power, whilst               
strengthening state organisations (Home Office, 2001a, 2010). The emphasis on parental responsibility            
and anti-social behaviour (Muncie 1999: 156), for instance, appears linked to the broader issue of the                
weakening of micro-community ties and their moral foundations, raised by moral communitarianists.            
More generally, this understanding opens the way for the investment (symbolic and material) in the               
community/neighbourhood as a site of the fight against both crimes and actions which embody lack of                
respect/responsibility (ACPO, 2011: 5). This investment is also bolstered by two different            
criminological stances, which emerge between 1980s and 1990s. The first is the notorious ‘broken              
window’ speculation which had a documented impact on British policy (Home Office, 2003b; Labour              
Party, 1995), in terms of justifying (muscular) early-intervention programs (exemplified by anti-social            
behaviour orders). A further (more inclusive) support is offered by the ​“third way” criminologies              
(Hughes, 2007: 23; O’Malley, 1996) based on the idea of crime as a “real” effect of the progressive                  
erosion of micro-moral ties localised in discrete communities (Braithwaite, 1989, 2002; Duff, 2000;             
Lea and Young, 1984). The focus is posited on the promotion of partnerships between the public,                
private and voluntary sectors to identify and implement community-based crime prevention measures            
(Hoyle and Noguera, 2008; Hughes, 2007: 73). This narrative encourages people, communities and             
organisations to partake in crime prevention activities, as well as to reduce certain types of crime and                 
the fear of crime (Morgan report, 1991). In the same vein, are advanced ideas of citizens as ‘partners                  
against crime’ and of state agencies’ devolving ‘power’ and sharing the work ‘of social [and crime]                
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control with local organizations and communities’ (Garland, 2001: 205) which will be vital symbolic              
resources for the development of the representation of the community as a crime stakeholder in RJ                
(ANONYMISED). 
 
Lack of efficiency and the managerial State 
The rise of widespread managerial concerns in the delivery of public services, including criminal              
justice, is a problematic with deep historical roots, mainly linked to the neoliberal and neoconservative               
portrayals of post-war welfare regimes’ crisis. This is framed in the 1980s as both economic, financial                
and ideological crisis, whose main effects are the hypertrophic bureaucracy and the            
de-responsibilisation of individuals and communities, resulting, ​inter alia, in idleness, crime and            
disorder (Newman and Clarke, 1997: 14). The ‘more and better management’ formula is presented as               
one of the solutions to the problems of the welfare state in Britain (Newman and Clarke, 1997),                 
inspiring the creation of new forms of political regulation. Especially the idea of ‘reinventing              
government’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 in Newman and Clarke, 1997: 37), i.e. the importing in the                
public sector of private companies’ categories of thought, is deemed as strategic to respond to the                
problematic at stake, including the rise of crime and disorder. In this area, the criminal justice system’s                 
lack of performance is described as one of the main causes of crime (Home Office, 2001b). The                 
“crisis” of traditional penal institutions is framed in terms of failing to reach relevant targets, absence                
of professionalism and cost-effectiveness, or more in general lack of an economic-minded steer             
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2013: 21). The political rejoinder to this, is to empower the private sector to                 
pursue innovation by prompting new ways of regulating offenders’ behaviours. This is the case of               
high-tech controls (Nellis, 2009: 101), and more broadly, of strategies toward the privatisation and              
modernisation of criminal justice (Auld report, 2011; Glidewell report, 1998). The growth of measures              
relying on an assumed ‘contractual capacity’ of the offender/deviant, including youth offenders            
(Crawford, 2009: 181), based on a moral ground but expressed in language drawn from the private                
enterprising vocabulary, is a further example of this cultural climate. RJ, especially as a policing               
option, is promoted as a “less paperwork” intervention and as such an appealing “street justice”               
instrument (ACPO, 2011; Home Office, 2009; Restorative Justice Council, 2014: 10). RJ also resonates              
with the ideas of satisfying the consumers (of justice) and of community-based governance which              
complement the ‘more and better management’ strategy (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 in O’Malley,             
2009: 10). 
 
The problematics sketched out above, intersect and conflict at multiple levels. Managerial issues such              
as slow prosecution and lack of coordination are considered key weaknesses of the youth justice               
system, to be tackled with by speeding up the process, as well as by (third way) multi-agency strategies                  
(Audit Commission, 1996). Multi-agency responses are also integral to a victim-centered criminal            
justice, as seen above. Reparation programs and payback to victims are often justified in terms of                
‘value for money’ and ‘payment by result’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010: 41-42). However, contractual              
responses to everyday youth offenders may be perceived as a disappointing “soft option” by victims’               
movements (Davis, 1992: 33) and managerial constraints may have de-responsibilising effects and            
contribute towards the eclipse of moral communities. These intricate relations generate an assemblage             
of predicaments/responses which represents a condition of possibility for the development of RJ. The              
transformation of disparate reparative practices, at the margins of the British criminal justice, into RJ               
(i.e. an ensemble of discourses underpinning laws, services, policy bodies, funds, scholarly works),             
becomes possible firstly due to an epistemological shift. When those practices can be configured, at the                
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same time, as an instrument to responsibilise everyday youth offenders, a response to politicised              
victims’ needs, a “third way” strategy of revitalising dying communities as well as a less costly justice                 
option, then, RJ becomes possible. Yet, the tensions between and within problematics migrate into RJ               
whereby themes such as empowering and shaming, rethinking of crime and acceptance of             
criminalisation, satisfying victims and safeguarding offenders, uneasily cohabitate. The further shift           
from possible to “real” (but ambivalent) response to crime, is related to the inscription of RJ into the                  
social body through governmental technologies. 
 
3.2 Political technologies 
 
Securitisation 
This technology consists of the range of strategies, techniques and procedures which have enacted, over               
the last 30 years, in the UK and the western world broadly, the securitisation of personal safety                 
(Schuilenburg, 2012: 75) and the distribution of responsibility for its delivery (Garland, 2001: 125).              
Such devices respond to the “need” of controlling everyday offenders, empowering communities and             
victims, relying less on state interventions and more on the same users’ participation. The moral               
communitarianism, the political re-invention of the victim as well as the new managerialism, have              
played the role (along with other factors) of the cultural justification of the material production of this                 
form of security – forward-looking, plural, responsibilising. Community safety measures can be            
considered an instance of this technology, insofar as they aim to prevent assumed future (anti-social)               
behaviour (Crawford, 2003: 490). More broadly, the widespread trend (invoked by the Morgan report              
in 1991), of distribution responsibility across an array of actors in delivering this negative/private              
security is an example of the technology at stake (Bayley and Shearing, 1996: 588; Crawford, 2003:                
481). While the state remains a relevant subject in the provision of negative security (especially for                
persistent or “alien” offenders), it is not the only player, and under certain circumstances, it may not                 
even be the most important one. This means that community-based actors complement state agencies in               
providing security. Individuals and groups are invited to take responsibility for their own security; they               
are encouraged to distribute among themselves the concern to create ‘livable’ spaces by reducing crime               
opportunities (Garland, 2001: 125). The creation of youth offender panels or measures such as youth               
offender contracts and parental orders, that is, the legal supports of RJ programmes in England and                
Wales, are further examples of this technology. In RJ, in fact, individuals and communities are at the                 
same time providers and users of security services (Pavlich, 2005: 81). From this perspective, RJ makes                
sense as a de-centralised strategy of providing negative security, by relying on (and indirectly              
promoting) the users’ capability to take care of themselves. In RJ, the overarching claim is to invest on                  
interventions on crimes which emphasise the direct involvement (i.e. responsibilisation) of a plurality             
of stakeholders (‘victims’, ‘offenders’ and ‘communities’). The state, here, plays a “low profile”, but              
still relevant, role. This is evident in England and Wales, whereby RJ practices are often               
state-sponsored, led by state representatives (police officers, probation officers etc.) and re-enact the             
state-based criminal justice language and mindset (dichotomy victim/offender, offender’s admission of           
guilt as a condition to enter RJ programs etc.) (Davis, 1992: 25).  
 
Hybridisation  
The second technology includes devices which perform a “hybrid” (i.e. beyond the public/private             
divide) way of control over a wide set of social issues, including crime and deviance (Rose, 2001a).                 
This technology appears intertwined with the knowledge produced and promoted by the “third way”              
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sciences and consistent with the community-based ‘more and better management’, with their drive             
toward the identification of new spaces/ways (e.g. the community) for ​doing social control. This can be                
seen, for instance, in respect of policing policy (‘community policing’), penal policy (‘punishment in              
the community’), justice policy (‘community mediation’) (Crawford, 1999), and also of RJ, whereby             
the role of efficient and pro-social communities is strongly emphasised (ANONYMISED). The            
community is posited as ‘the ideal territory for the administration of individual and collective              
existence, the plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualized             
and administered’ (Rose, 1996a: 331). The concept of ‘community’ here represents a singular hybrid              
between the notion of ‘civil society’ offered by the ‘left’ – as the alternative to centralised statism and                  
to the free market doctrine (Rose, 1999a: 168) – the moral communitarian insistence on traditional               
values and the idea championed by contemporary civic republicanism of community as a means by               
which to arrest liberal individualism (Rose, 1999a: 170). The development of hybrid technologies of              
government can be thought of as a supposed alternative to both free market individualism and               
state-centred collectivism, not only within social and economic policy, but also in criminal and penal               
policy. This appears to be the case of RJ: a third way of penal control, rooted in a perfected moral                    
community, whose epistemic basis lies beyond the criminologies of ‘the self’ and of ‘the other’, and                
whose instruments are apparently alternative to both expressive punishments and welfarist           
interventions (Garland, 2001: 15). RJ is ​par excellence about imaging participatory decision-making            
processes to deal with crimes, by empowering ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ within and through their              
‘communities’ to address the harm experienced.  
 
De-politicisation  
Here the focus is on methods and processes which aim to neutralise the moral, political, social, and                 
economic character of public issues (Rose, 1998: 165), in two different (and to some extent opposite)                
ways. Firstly through programs, practices and policies which “managerialise” the production of order.             
The political, ethical and social character of decision-making is neutralised and superseded by the              
regulating principles of effectiveness, efficiency and economy. The production of order relies on a              
“neutral” expertise which generates evidence-based support, distancing decision-makers from the          
moral and political substance of their decisions (Burnham, 2001: 127), reshaping popular perceptions             
of who is to blame for policy failures and reducing the operational liability of public institutions                
(Diamond, 2013: 7). The growth of policies and practices of risk-assessment, accountability,            
transparency and external validation in the criminal justice sector exemplify these technologies. Such             
mentality is characteristic of the New Labour’s style of government: on one hand devolution to private                
actors on the other strategic ‘strengthening of the core executive [...] over policy-making and              
implementation process’ (Diamond, 2013: 2). This is clearly expressed by New Labour criminal and              
penal policy whereby multi-agency partnerships are paralleled by authoritarian instruments, like in the             
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and where managerial concerns are a non-negotiable guiding principle              
of reform. Furthermore, the development of problem-solving, fast-track and low-cost justice           
approaches, like RJ (ACPO, 2011: 5; Marshall, 1999: 5), resonates with managerial devices of control.               
Whilst the first range of techniques ends up limiting people’s individual responsibility by de-activating              
the political/social content of a variety of problematics, the second set of devices of de-politicisation               
works by installing a concept of the human subject as an ‘autonomous, individualized, self-directing,              
decision-making agent’ (Rose, 1999b: 499). Here the goal is to offer individuals and groups new               
opportunities to participate actively in various arenas of action ‘to resolve the kind of issues hitherto                
held to be the responsibility of authorized governmental agencies’ (Burchell, 1996: 29). Operationally,             
9 
 
this is possible in different ways, for instance through the popularisation of what Rose calls               
‘psy-complex’ (1985). This expression refers to an array of techniques for the incorporation of              
psychological ideas about human resources and group dynamics into an increasing number of social              
domains, as well as to the nature and implications of the proliferation of psychotherapies (Rose, 1990).                
From a criminal and penal control viewpoint, these second set of devices emphasises individual              
agency, at the expenses of socio-structural factors, as far as the “causes” of crimes and the ways to                  
address them and their consequences are concerned. RJ embodies this perspective, whereby crime is              
fundamentally a matter of interpersonal conflict to be dealt with by the same conflicting parties; the                
role of social determinants or macro-relations of power, is neglected if not denied.  
 
RJ reaches the threshold of a ‘practicable’ penal discourse (Gordon, 1991: 3) when its language, moral                
justifications and epistemic forms become integral to political strategies of securitisation, hybridisation            
and depoliticisation. This is possible insofar as, during the second half on the 1990s, RJ interventions                
are incorporated into apparatuses of negative security for responsible users/providers, located within            
‘ideal’ communities. Additionally, the inscription of RJ into the social body requires the             
de-politicisation of both RJ’s matter (from public offences to interpersonal conflicts) and goals (from              
punishment to personal healing/empowerment). This is not a smooth process, since the technologies’             
aims are not easily compatible. There are tensions between individual responsibilisation and            
community involvement, as much as between managerial order and healing/empowerment or between            
distribution of responsibility and the Leviathan’s “informal” support. This affects RJ’s structure,            
stretched across multiple and ambivalent aspirations (e.g. satisfying victims’ need of negative security             
and healing, enabling offenders’ empowerment and reducing re-offending, investing in individual           
agency through communities). The analysis of the competing political rationalities which drive            
problematics and technologies can further clarify reasons and consequences of this genetic            
ambivalence.  
 
 
3.3 Political Rationalities 
 
Political rationalities are the discursive patterns of ends, means, justifications and limitations            
formulated by multiple actors and driving the process of government (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175).               
Neoliberal and neoconservative rationalities, strategically opposed to the ​welfarist mentality, seem to            
inform the problematics and technologies charted above​. ​This combination manifests itself in different             
ways, depending on several contextual factors. Here it is heuristically useful the ‘inclusive’ side of this                
political assemblage (O’Malley, 2009: 9), conceptualised, following Rose (1996b, 2001b), as           
‘ethopolitics’, though a further refinement of this interpretive scheme is necessary (Garland, 1997;             
O’Malley, 1999). Whilst in fact Rose considers ethopolitics as a specific advanced-liberal political             
rationality, in this paper this concept is used to encapsulate only one possible way of expressing the                 
fluid relations between the political mentalities mentioned above as well as their inconsistent synthesis              
and effects.  
From a governmentality perspective, neoliberalism is a self-limiting political mentality, based on the             
superimposition of the market rationality on the entire reality (Foucault, 2008). The ‘market’, as              
smooth space of contractual relations and ‘site of veridiction’ of policies and practices (Foucault, 2008:               
32), is a distinctive product of neoliberalism. The marketisation of public agencies, including the              
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managerialisation of criminal justice services, is driven by this mentality of government. The             
development of a ‘contractual’ culture, the rise of victims-as-consumers, the abdication of thinking in              
terms of ‘social causes’ of crime, the focus on responsibilisation instantiated by technologies of plural               
security and hybrid governance, are all expressions of the neoliberal way of thinking. In the relevant                
context, this rationality enters in a mobile alliance (O’Malley, 1999: 185) with the neoconservative              
mentality, i.e. with a ‘social authoritarian’ mode of governing built around problematics such as the               
weakening of the nation, the breakdown of the nuclear family and the lack of moral community.                
Discipline, cultivation of the virtues of law and order and respect for the traditions are the responses to                  
these issues. Here the object of government is a range “natural” communities, united by moral and                
traditional ties, coalescing around exclusive identities. The (partly) converging elements of this alliance             
are the ideas of a sovereign state as law and order enforcer and the centrality of the market (O’Malley,                   
1999: 187), whilst the tensions lie around concepts of social contract, self-interest and morality              
(O’Malley, 1999: 186). ​This inconsistent combination, is glued by a strategic “foreclosure” of the              
welfarist mode of social government, portrayed as spreading culture of dependency, individual            
de-responsibilisation, lack of morality and uncontrolled growth of bureaucracy. Around these issues the             
alliance at stake emerges as a strategic response. The welfarist rationale is “included by exclusion” in                
this alliance, since it connects neoliberal and neoconservative mentalities as a constant danger to be               
continuously evoked and exorcised. The rather contradictory pathway to freedom/morality is the            
alternative to the ‘road to serfdom’. The welfarist mentality, clearly is not only an imaginary common                
enemy. This is actually present, as political rationale, in multiple penal discourses, including some of               
those relevant for the historical emergence of RJ. This is the case of the idea of RJ initially elaborated                   
within the probation context as a rehabilitative technique (Davis, 1992: 22), as well as by third sector                 
organisations (e.g. NACRO), even though their proposals came to be articulated in “serendipitous”             
ways by political parties (e.g. New Labour). 
This combination of political rationalities configures a compounded style of government not reducible             
to a particular political philosophy or economy, but, as argued above, rather characterised by its type of                 
problematics and technologies, that is, ‘ethopolitics’. The main feature of ethopolitics is to shift              
government from questions of rational administration of population to those of individual everyday             
morality and ethics, from taking care of collectivity to the controlled empowerment of individual              
responsibilities of self-government, in order to make people governable ‘at a distance’ (Miller and              
Rose, 1990: 9). The securitisation and the de-politicisation of social matters, connected to the spreading               
of hybrid arenas of governance, result in a sustained investment on individual agency, at the expenses                
of structural constraints which are “replaced” by morally cohesive communitarian ties (Pathak, 2014:             
1–2). The neoliberal ​choice (emphasised in RJ practices) becomes a crucial site of political              
intervention: individuals must become free, must enjoy a specific form of freedom linked to a particular                
idea of responsibility, rooted in a moral (neoconservative) community (that is, the “setting” of RJ               
interventions). The combination between freedom to choose and morally cohesive communities elicits            
a reciprocal alteration, resulting in the superimposition of a “centripetal” freedom, since ‘the choice’ is               
filtered and enabled by the community’s moral fabric. The proliferation of themes such as local               
autonomy, victims’ participation, community empowerment, as well as reparation, seems informed by            
the ethopolitical tension toward the re-definition of people’s relation with themselves, in terms of              
open-ended futures, transforming the individual ethos (constituted by shared sentiments, beliefs,           
values) in a crucial political matter. In RJ, the encounter, reparation of harm and personal               
transformation are all moral choices which aim to mend a wounded relation of trust and               
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interdependency. This choice is mediated by discrete communities (Rose, 2001a: 4) which make             
possible to match the emphasis on the individual responsibility with shared norms of civility.  
 
3.3 Subjectivation 
 
A distinctive type of subjectivation of individuals is integral to the deployment of ethopolitical              
responses to problematics of government. On one hand, ‘intensely subjective’ beings (i.e. responsible             
for their destiny) (Rose, 1990: 3) are shaped by processes of de-socialisation of security and of                
hybridisation of governance. On the other, these subjectivities are constrained by managerial            
limitations as well as by the tight moral ties of cohesive communities. RJ embodies such a janus-faced                 
subjectivation process, insofar as participants to restorative programs are hailed by a plurality of              
inconsistent discourses. RJ, in fact, emphasises at the same time, both the critical role of communal                
networks in supporting ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ and the agentic responsibility of individual actors.             
‘Victims’ and ‘offenders’ are deemed to have the necessary psychological, moral and practical             
resources to engage in ‘restoration’, which is the outcome of their deliberate decisions. They are the                
only ones who can repair, compensate or apologise for what happened. The impact on crimes of any                 
form of socio-structural factor is not taken into account, relying on individual agency as a necessary                
and sufficient site for the regulation of crimes. RJ actors appear as ‘responsible subject[s] of moral                
community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms’ (Rose, 2000: 321). Yet, RJ is                
not a (pure neoliberal) form of privatisation of conflict. The ‘restoration’ can happen only against the                
backdrop of a community-as-moral-stabiliser and under the auspices of a managerial state, which             
regulates the effects of restorative encounters on “conventional” criminal justice. Such an ambivalent             
subjectivation process is related to the constitutive tensions and contradictions which characterise            
ethopolitics. Neoliberal, neoconservative and welfarist rationalities are overlapping yet opposing in           
many respects and at multiple levels. If, in fact, mobile alliances make possible the actual government,                
they also carry a load of discordant representations, claims and responses. This generates tensions and               
contradictions at level of both political programs and technologies, which translate into penal options,              
‘volatile and contradictory’ in turn (O’Malley, 1999). However, the incoherent nature of ethopolitics is              
also the very condition for the development of resistance to it. It is in the “cracks”, “gaps” and “holes”                   
engendered by those tensions that spaces of contestations (and active subjectivation) will likely arise as               
possibilities to be seized upon by individuals and groups (Rose and Miller, 1992: 190).  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims to insert the development of RJ into a specific socio-political milieu, and to bring to                  
the fore some historical contingencies which RJ is tied to. The transformation of sparse reparative               
practices, with limited social, political and cultural traction, in a practicable penal policy option, is               
possible due to the development of competing political problematics and technologies informed by a              
strategic convergence of rationalities, that is, ethopolitics. This is not an orderly combination of              
political mentalities, being actually replete with constitutive tensions, expressed by contradictions at            
level of political programs and technologies, which produce, ​inter alia​, conflicting penal policies. It is               
not only the emergence but also the inner structure of RJ which suffers of the same fragmentation                 
which characterises the political milieu within which it arises. RJ imports into the penal policy arena an                 
ambivalent vocabulary which emphasises individual responsibility in and through cohesive          
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communities, empowering through shaming, rethinking of crime but not of criminalisation, critique of             
punishment but not of the “penal”, priority of victims’ needs but also of offenders’ rights. A question                 
which could be raised now, is whether the political conditions for the emergence of RJ are also its                  
destiny​: is it possible to envisage a RJ which runs counter to ethopolitical imperatives, whereby the                
‘subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to question power about                 
its discourse of truth’ (Foucault, 1996: 386)? The constitutive incoherence of political mentalities (and              
of derivative penal policies) is the theoretical condition for contestation to arise. Furthermore, spaces of               
resistance likely occur when technologies are crystallised in practices and institutions (that is, at level               
of the ‘real governmental practice’ (Foucault, 2008: 2)), due to e.g. professional rivalries, lack of               
technical conditions, communication short-circuits and so on. A theoretical and empirical investigation            
of these spaces, is a desirable challenge ahead for a critical RJ scholarship as well as for a RJ                   
movement which aims to be not only successful (by gaining more funds, services and regulations) but                
also self-critical​ ​(by becoming more aware of its history, limitations and risks).  
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